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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
ST.A .. TE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
FRANK R. HILL, 
Defendant and Appellrutt. 
·BRIEF OF APPEl~LANT 
PROCEEDINGS UP TO THE TIME 0~., TRIAL 
In October, 1939, complaint was filed before a 
justice of the peace at D·elta, 1\tlilla.rd County, Utah, 
charging the defendant with a felony. The com .. 
plaint alleged that on the 31st of July, 1939, the 
defendant ''did obtain 112,905 pounds of alfalfa hay 
of the value of $536.30 from Dudley and ~e·ed 
Crafts by means of false ·pretenses.'' (See Judg-
ment R.oll, p. 1). 
A preliminary he·aring 'vas had and on 10ctober 2·6, 
1939, defendant was bound over to the D'istrict 
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Court for trial. Mr. W. R. ·Walker, a layman, rep-
resented the defendant at this hearing. ( J. R. 4). 
An information in the exact language o.f the com-
plaint was filed January 2·2, 1940. (J. R. 6). The 
defendant filed a motion to quash the information 
on the following grounds: 
(1) That the information did not state 
facts suffi.cicnt to constitute a public 
offense; 
(2) · Th~t no tacts were set forth in the in-
formation from 'vhich the defendant could 
determine with what he was cha.rg~ed; 
(3) That the information did not comply 
with the provisions of 
Article I, Section XII of the Constitution 
of Utah; 
( 4) That it did not set forth facts suffi-
cient to enable the defendant to properly 
defend the action ; 
(5) That it did not comply with 
Sec. 105-11-1, R. S. Utah, 1933; 
(6) That more than one offense was 
attempted to he charged; 
(7) That the language of the informa-
tion "by means of false pretenses" was 
uncertain, indefinite and did not app~rise 
the defendant of anything. The defendant 
demurred to the information upon the same 
grounds. ( J. R. 91). 
Without waiving the motion to quash, demand for 
a bill of particulars waSAiduly made (J. R. 10). The 
bill of particulars was filed February 23, 1940. It 
a.lleg1ed that on or about July 31, 1939, at Delta, 
Millard County, Utah, the complaining witness, 
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Dudley Crafts, had a conversation· with the de-
fendant and that Crafts asked the defendant, ''Have 
you enough credits coming' in to take care of your 
debts, because if you hnyen 't 1 vvill not sell you 
the hay!" and that Hill replied that he had suffi-
cient credits due to pny all bills and the anlolmt due 
Crafts for the hay then about to be purchased; that 
upon that representation Crafts sold the defendant 
the ihay; that the statement of defendant was fals;e 
and untrue, which the defendant knew and that the 
1
defendant was at the time insolvent (J. R. 12). 
After the filing of this bill of p~articulars, a supple-
mental motion to quash the information was duly 
made alleg"ing1 the same grounds that had been set 
forth in the original motion; that the bill of P'ar-
ticulars "~as insufficient, and that insufficient facts 
were set forth to enable the defendant to properly 
defend the action; that the facts stated did not con-
stitute a public offense and that it could not be 
ascertained upon what terms the hay mentioned 
was sold, whether for cash or credit, and i~ on 
credit what vvere the terms of payment. There was 
also a motion to strike the bill of particulars upon 
the same grounds as made in 'the motion. · 
The case had been duly set for trial for February 
23, 1940, at 10:00 A. M. Arguments 'vere duly had 
on the motions to quash, motions to strike and the 
demurrer and the district attorney stated that he 
' -
'F'-'"11ld furnish a supplemental bill of particulars., 
''Thich was filed at 2:00 P. 1'[. of February 23d. 
After the filing of this supplemental bill of p·ar-
ticulars, it was agreed that the supplemental mo-
tion filed against the former b1ll of p~articulars 
and information should be deemed to apply to the 
infonnation as it stood 'vith the supplemental 
bill of particulars filed. These motions vvere over-
ruled. 
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PROCEEDINGS HAD· AND EVIDENCE GIVEN 
AT THE TRIAL. 
A trial by jury was waived, a plea of not, guilty was 
entered. (Tr. 6-7). Objection was. inade by the de-
fendant to the introduction of any testimony on 
the following grounds: (1) that the court had no 
jurisdiction of the offense attempted to be alleged; 
(2). that the information did not state a pubU(l 
offense. 
Over the objection of the defendant, the bill of par-
ticulars was amended by interlineation in the fol-
lowing particulars: ''that the above f::;tatements 
\vere not made in writing, hut were made orally," 
and at the end of the information, the following was 
added: "and that the said statements of the de-
fendant \Vere made with the intent to cheat or de-
fraud the said Dudley and Reed Crafts, '' ( J. R. 
17). 
The same objections were made· to the supplemental 
bill of particulars as amended. These objections 
were overruled, and the following proceedings werP 
then had: 
The State offered the following: 
DUDLEY CRAFTS testified that in July, 1939 the 
defendant was engaged in buying alfalfa hay and 
grinding it; that on or about the 31st of Ju]y he 
had a conversation over the telephone with the de-
fendant regardin~ the sale of the hay; that the dP ... 
fendant stated he wanted to buy a stack of hay, and 
that hP (Crafts) replied that the hay belonged to 
his brother Reed. That that same afternoon thP 
witness went to Hill Bros. Milling Company and 
told defendant that he had come do\vn to find out 
just what th~ exact 'financial condition of the Hill 
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Bros. Milling Company 'yas, before he could let him 
have the hay; that the defendant said : 
''Dudley, this time 've ar~ g-oing to tell you the 
truth about it. · \\T e have got outstanding accounts, 
good accounts, to pay every dollar we . owe. You 
understand how it is, 'Ye send this stuff out over 
the country to the poultrymen and stock markets; 
they are slovr pay, but they are g-ood p1ay. We 
al,vays get our money.'' 
Crafts replied that that was alJ;he wanted to know; 
that if the company ha~;z;:tto pay for the hay, 
if that was true, then they eould have it, and upon 
that representation he and Reed Crafts s.old the 
hay; that there was something over 50 tons, and 
that the price was $536.00; the defendant asked if 
it would be all right to pay for the hay in thirty 
days, the first of September, and that Crafts said 
yes, that would be all right (Tr. 11-12'); that within 
the next two or three days the trucks 'vere sent 
down and got the hay; that through legal proceed-
ings he had received about $2'46.00. (Tr. 14) .. 
That the last business conducted by defendant at 
Delta was on the 19th of October~ 1939; that at that 
time a committee?- had been appointed to take over 
the affairs of the company and this com-
mittee had p·aid some of the bills ow\ing 
by the company, (Tr. 15); that in October, 
1939 he had a conversation with the· defendant 
as to the accounts receivable, and at that time de-
fendant said the company (nved approximately 
$22.000.00 and had no accounts receivable (Tr.17). 
CROSS - EXA.lfiNATION: 
On cross-examination. thP '\vitness testified that he 
had hPPn selling hay to Hill Bros. l\filling Company 
a corporation, since June, 1937; that the defendant 
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waR vice-president and manager of the company; 
that on July 31, 1939 l\1r. Hill "\vanted to buy ,some 
hay for the company, and that he, the witness, 
wanted to 1:find out the financial condition of the coin-
pany; that he asked Hill how the company stood, 
and that Hill stated that the company had out-
standing accounts to pay every dollar that it o·wed; 
(Tr. 19) that Hill requested a thirty days' credit, 
and stated that the company could pay ,for the hay 
in thirty days; that it 'vas, because he had ;been led 
i.o believe· that the eompany had enough' money to 
pay every dollar it owed, that he sold the hay to 
the company (Tr. 20); that Mr. I. N. Parker owned 
half of the hay and that Reed Crafts owned a half; 
that he (Crafts) waR selling it for them, but had no 
interest in it (Tr. 21). 
We also sold second crop. hay hut that was a dif-
ferent transaction. The hay involved here was sold 
on thirty days credit. 
''A. There was no payment made :p~rior 
to September on this becat-ise it -was not 
due, he had two accounts, this "\vas on the 
other account, this payment was n1ade on 
the second crop. 
Q. Was the second crop due 7 
.A.. It was due when they got it. 
Q. It was all on the first the credit was 
extendedT 
A. Yes. 
Q. This credit was extended to the com-
pany on Mr. Hill's statement, as you have 
stated? 
A. That is true. 
Q. How? 
A. That is true. 
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' 
Q. There is no question about that 1 
A. There is no question about it. 
Q. How! 
A. No. 
Q. On the repres-entation that he made as 
to the financial condition of the company! 
A. On the representation that he made 
as to the financial condition of the com-
pany, that is true.'' 
Afterwards the committee took over the affairs of 
the company, and Hill p·romised to turn over the 
stock of the corporation, but never did it. Crafts 
brought suit against the corporation on the very 
account of the sale of this hay. The complaint 
which is verified by him and the other pap,ers re-
lating to it are on account of this hay. (These 
pap·ers are mark8d Exhibit a and are :part of the 
record). 
Defendant's Exhibit 2, which 'vas received in evi-
dence, consists of the summons, writ of attachment 
and complaint, affidavit for attachme-nt and ex-
ecution in the case of I. R. Parker v. Hill Bros.. 
Alfalfa Milling Company, a corporation. This \vas 
a suit for the amouat due on the hay that it i~ 
claimed in this criminal proceeding \Vas obtained 
by false pretenses. Tn~ hay; belong1ed to I. R. 
Parker and Reed Crafts, and we brought a e1vil 
suit for Parker's 'part of it. Mr. Parker never 
assigned any of his claim to Reed Crafts and Reed 
Crafts never assigned any part of hi$ to Mr. 
Parker (Tr. 27). 
:Defendant's Exhibit 1 is the statement rendered 
to Reed and Dudley Crafts. showing the amount of 
hay sold, payments made and the balance due. 
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DARYL PEARSON testified that from ~Tu1y, 1938 
to August of 1939 he worked for Hill Bros. Alfalfa 
1\{illing Company, that he 'vas . the secretary and 
treasurer of the company and also kept the books ; 
that he made a financial statement to the board of 
directors as of the month of June, 1939 err. 28); 
that he got his information from the books of the 
corporation. This rep~ort was marked plaintiff's 
Exhibit A and was introduced in evidence over the 
objection of ~the defendant. That as to the iten1s 
machinery and equipment, building and land, hP 
could not tell ho"\V they came to have the value that 
was placed upon them (Tr. 3.2). That he left the 
service of thee company August 20, 1939 ( Tr. 3.5) ; 
that the financial condition of the company was 
better by between six and eight hundred dollars 
July 31st than it "\Vas June 30, 1939; that he was 
in the office and heard the conversation between 
Dudley Crafts and the defendant; that !\f.r. Crafts 
wanted to know 'if the eompany was in ~ood con ... 
dition, and Mr. Hill said that the company was; 
tha.t Mr. Crafts said he did not want to sell the hay 
to the comp·any unless he was sure he would get 
his money (Tr. 42). 
On cross ;examination, the witness testified tha.t 
v1hen Dudley Crafts came to the office, he (Crafts) 
wanted to know whether the business was in a con-
dition where he wouldn't lose his money, that hP. 
said he couldn't afford to lose· it and that 1\{r. I-Iill 
stated that the company would be able to pay for 
the hay in thirty da.ys ( Tr. 43). 
DUDLEY CRAFTS was recalled and testified that 
in Oetober of 1939 he told the defendant tha.t when 
the defendant bought the- hay from him (Crafts), 
the defendant lied to him, and that he knew he was 
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lying when he said they had enough money to p~ay 
eyery bill they 0\Yed, and that the defendant said 
yes, but that if he had not said that, Crafts would 
not haYe sold him the hay (Tr. 45). 
It was agreed that Mr. Rulon Hinckley, ~lr. Frank 
Roberts and Mr. Peter Gronning would testify sub-
stantially as Dudley Crafts had done as to this last 
conversation of October, 1939. 
The foregoing constitutes all the evidence received 
at the trial 
Thereupon the State and defendant rested .. 
'rhe defendant moved for a dismissal of the cas.e 
because of a fatal variance as to the_ ownership of 
the hay; also that there was no evidence offered 
or given as to the solvency or insolvency of the 
defendant; that there was no evidence offered or 
given that the defendant was insolvent at the time 
the hay was purchased, or at any other time; that 
no evidence had been given whatever as to the 
financial condition of the defendant· that the tran-
' saction appeared to he wholly with the corpora-
tion of which the defendant was the manager (Tr. 
47); that no evidence has been given which showed 
or tended to show that the defendant was guilty. 
The court refused to pass on this motion, refused 
to decide the case and held that the evidence showed 
that the hay belonged to Reed Crafts and I. R. 
Parker and that Dudley Crafts had authority to 
sell it; that there was no evidence as to the sol·· 
vency or insolvency of the defendant individually 
(Tr. 48). 
The court then stated that if the information re-
ferred to a rep~resentation as. to the financial con-
dition of the corporation and that the hay 'vas sold 
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to the corporation in reliance upon the financial 
condition of the corporation, that evidence had been 
offered to sustain such an information, but if the 
information referred to a representation as to the 
ability of the defe-ndant individually to pay for it, 
'then there was no proof of the defendant's guilt; 
that under the p~rovisions of 
·Sees. 105-21-43 and 105-21-44, Laws of 
Utah, 1935, 
it would he proper to direct that the bill of par-
ulars be amen9.ed, or that a new bill of particulars 
be furnished which sets out the matters that the 
court has referred to as being proved so there will 
be no question as to the charge that is made against 
the defendant: 
That proof had been offered showing obtaining 
property unde~ false p1retenses, but that the hill of 
particulars is not definite enough and does not 
properly cover the false pretenses 'v hich appears 
have been proved; that the original bill of partic-
ulars referred to this statement of the defendant 
\Vhich i_s alleged to have been a false pretense; that 
the original bill stated that ''Hill replied that he 
had sufficient credits to pay all hills and the amount 
due Crafts for the hay;'' that the supplemental bill 
of particulars refer:;; to a statement that ''we have 
enough outstanding accounts to pay every dollar 
that 've owe." The information is silent as to the 
p.articulars of the offense so that it could refer to 
a statement made as to the financial condition of the 
c.ompany or the defendant individually. 
He then ordered that the bill of particulars should 
be amended to show the particulars of the offense 
\vhich appeared to have been p~roven and that thP. 
defendant could ask for a reopening of the cas,e 
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so as to offer further evidence if he desired. To 
all such rulings the defendant duly excepted (Tr. 
50). 
The court then directed that the bill of particula,rs 
be amended to sho,v that on July 31, 19a9, Dudley 
Crafts discussed '"ith the defendant the sale of hay 
which belonged to R.eed Crafts and I. R. Parker, and 
that Dudley Crafts in the conversation said, ''I 
'Ya.nt to knovr "\Yhat your financial condition is be-
fore we let you have the hay,'' and that the de-
fendant stated that the company was in good 
financial condition and had outstanding accountS! 
receivable sufficient to pay all of its liabilities, and 
that the statement was false and was then known to 
the defendant to be false, and that Dudlev Crafts 
relied upon the statement being true and i~-- reliance 
sold the hay in question (Tr. 51). The State was 
allowed ten days in which to file this supplemental 
bill of particulars and on March 4, 1940, filed the 
said supplemental bill (J. R. 18). 
PROCEEDINGS AFTER TRIAL 
i\.fter,vards, the defendant 'vas directed to appear 
hefore the col!_rt on ..... t\.pril 9, 1940, "rhich he did. At 
that time, the defendant again moved the court to 
determine the case as it was at the time the State 
and the defendant rested, towit, February 24, 1940, 
and either declare the defendant ~lty or not 
guilty. This the court refused to do ( J. R. 24; 
Tr. 55). The court then asked the defendant. if he 
desired to plead to the charge since the supple-
mental l:ill of pHrticulars was filed; the defendant 
rrfnsed to plead, asserting there was no jurisdiction 
to hear any matter or proceeding on any pretendec~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
charge s.et forth 'in the supplemental bill of par-
ticulars filed as of March 4, 1940 ( Tr. 56). The 
court then stated that leave would be g;rru1ted to the 
defendant to submit further evidence; the defend-
ant stated that the court had already passed upon 
the evidence and had made a· declaration into the 
record that the defendan~ was guilty and that in 
view of that statement, he felt it would he us.eless 
to offer any evid~nce tn change the court's mind; 
that the court had no power or authority to pro-
ceed under the supplemental bill of particulars filed 
as of March 4, 1940; the court then found the de-
fendant guilty under the supplemental hill of par-
ticulars filed as of March 4, 1940, and sent.encced 
the defendap.t to from one to ten years in the State 
Penitentiary ( J. R. 24; Tr. 57 -59). 
ASSIGNME·N~rs OF ERROR 
The:.;-e are 24 assignments of error. 'J:he first six 
relate to the rulings of tne court upholding the in-
formation and the bills of particulars. Assign-
ments 7 to 17, each inclusive, relate to the admis-
sion of evidence. Assignment 18 relates to the re-
fusal of the court to dismiss the case because there 
'\Yas no proof offered as to the guilt of the defend-
ant. Assignments 19 and 21 relate to the supple-
mental bill of ~particulars filed March 4, 1940. No. 
20 relateS' to the refusal of the court to decide the 
ease upon the issues upon which th~ case vvas tried. 
Assignments 22 to 24, each inclusive, relate to the 
court's finding the defendant guilty and in sen-
tencing the defendant to the State prison. 
We will first discuss assigments 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 
and 24. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The complaint upon which the defendant was 
bound over to the District Court and the informa-
tion upon "~hich he \Yas tried were based on 
Sec. 103-18-8, R. S. Utah, 1933 
The information did not set forth what the false 
pretenses "~ere. The bill of p~a,rticulars filed Feb-
ruary 23, 1940 ( J. R. 12) set forth that at the time 
and place in question in answer to the question p~ut 
by the complaining .witness ''Have you enough 
credits comingw in to take_ care of your debts''' 
that the defendant repJied that he had sufficient 
credits due to pay all bills and the amount due 
Crafts for the hay then about to be p~urchased. 
The supplemental bill of particulars which waH 
filed February 23, 1940 ( J. R. 17) is practically to 
the same effect, stating that a.t the time and p~lacA 
in question Crafts said to the defendant, ''I want 
to know just what your financial condition is be-
fore we let you have the hay,'' and tha.t he could 
not let the defendant have the hay unless their 
financial condition was such tha.t they were sur~ 
to get their money, to which the defendant replied, 
"This time, Dudley, we are going to tell you th~· 
truth about it. The fact is, we have enough out-
standing accounts to pay every dollar we ow~~'" 
Upon the information, the hill of particulars and 
the supplemental bill of particulars the trial \vas 
had. The evidence in support of those alle.e:ation~ 
has heretofore been set forth in considerable de-
tail. Suffice it to Ray that on the day in question 
Mr. Crafts agreed to sell to Hill Brothers Alfalfa 
Milling Co. th~ hay in question; that Mr. Hill 
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as manager of the corporation, agreed to and did 
purchase it with the understanding that the com-
pany \vould be allowed thirty days in V\7hich to make 
payment; that Mr. Hill told Mr~ Crafts that the 
company had outstanding accounts sufficient to pav 
for the hay within thirty days.. In other vrords, the 
hay 'Yas sold to the company upon the agree1nent 
and understanding that the comp~any would pay for 
it within thirty days. Although the information, 
aided if it could be by the bills of particulars filed 
February 23, 1940, charg~d the defendant with 
representing that he "\vas financially able to pay 
for the hay, not a scintilla of evidence 'vas offered 
a.s t.o the financial s~anding} ability or condition of 
the defendant. 
There was no evidence of any kind what the finan-
cial standing of the defendant was; whether he was 
solvent or insolvent, affluent or penniless., wealthy 
or poverty-stricken, was not diselosed. Even the 
court, determined as he was to punish the defend-
ant, said at the conclus.sion of the evidence, that ''it 
further appears to the court that there is no evi-
dence as to the solvency or insolvency of the de-
fenda.nt." (Tr. 48). · 
The issue to be determined by the court was wbethel-
the repres·entation alleged to have been made by 
the defendant as to his solvency \vas true or not 
true; that was the issue which was tried. The State 
had alleged that the defendant obtained the bay 
upon the pretense that he, defend~nt, "ras solvent, 
whereas in truth and in fact the defendant \vas 1n-
solvent and that the representation he 1nade as to 
his solvency was untrue. 
There was a complete failure of proof. The State 
utterly failed to prove the charge against. th~ de-
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fendant, failed to p-rove that he made any rep·re~.. 
sentation as to his financial condition, failed to 
prove 'vha.t his financial eondition was. 'rhe court, 
having found, as he did, that there was no evi-
dence as to the solvency or insolvency of the de-
fendant, should have immediately found him not 
g'"uilty and discharged the defendant. h1stead, the 
court appeared determined to find him guilty of a 
charge upon ·~vhich he had never been bound over 
to the District Court, upon which no issue ha.d been 
made or trial had. 'rhe court apparently either did 
not understand what a failure of ·proof was, or con-
fused failure of proof 'vith an immaterial variance. 
The court app·arently believed that under 
Subdivision 2 of Sec. 105-21-43, L.a·ws of 
Utah, 1935, 
he could order a bill of p-articulars amended to con-
form to whatever evidence wa.s given. He took the 
view that even though there was a complete failure 
of proof as to the crime charged, that there "\Vas 
evidence as to some other crime·, and therefore he 
could order a bill of p,articula.rs filed that would 
cover the case made by the evidence, and that the 
defendant could not complain. The court's. theory 
seemed to be that if A was charged with the murder 
of B and a trial was had upon that issue and the 
evidence showed that instead of committing mur-
rler, A had burned do\Vn the house of 0, that the 
State could after trial file a bill of particulars set-
tjng forth that A had burned C 's hous,e down and 
that the defendant could then he· found guilty of 
arson. 
To the court's mind the original com-plain( the 
original information and the original bill of- par-
ticulars '\vhich attE:-mpted to explain, elucidate and 
clarify the information, '""ere of no consequence. All 
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the court seemed to be concerned with was what 
did the evidence show, and even though the evi-
denee showed an entirely different offense from 
that charged, a bill of particulars after the case had 
been closed would cover the defect and justice had 
been done. A most novel p,roceeding, to say the 
least. If such were the purpose and intent· of the 
so~called ''reformed procedure,'' let us hop~e and 
pray that no more reformations are attempted. 
The court apparently overlooked 
Sec. 104-14-2, · R. S. Utah, 1933, which 
provides,: 
''Where, however, the allegation of the 
cl~im or defense to which the vroof is 
directed is unproved, not in some partic-
ular or particulars only but in its general 
&cop~e and meaning, it is not to be deemed 
a case of variance, but a failure of proof.'' 
That statute is directly app~licable to the cage at 
bar. The allega.tions made ·by the State were un-
proved. They were unproved in their g1eneral scope 
and meaning. There was a comp~lete failure of 
proof The court should have discharged the de-
fendant. 
The purchase of goods on the p:r;omise to pay i:n 
the future is not a fal8e p.retense. A false pretense 
is a misrepresentation as to an existing fact or 
past event, and not a mere promise to do something 
in the future or a misrepresentatjon as to some---
thing to take ·place in the future. See 
People v. Green, (Cal.), 133 Pac. 334. 
Taylor v. Territory, (Old.), 99 Pac. 628. 
State v. Leonard, (Ore.), 144 Pac. 113. 
State v. I..ts·nn, ('Wash.), 154 Pac. 79Ft 
Jacobson v. State, (Ariz.), 209 Pac. 310. 
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,,~illis Y. State, (Ariz.), 271 Pac. 725. 
People v. Moore, (Cal.) 256 Pac. 266. 
People v. ''11ite, (Cal.), 259 Pac. 76. 
People Y. Orris, (Colo.), 121 P·ac. 163. 
Huckaby v. State, (Okl.), 211 Pac. 525. 
In State v. Ho\Yd, 56 Utah 527, 
the Supreme Court of this State followed the prin-
cipJe announced in the above cases. In that case 
the Court held that the representation fi·y the buyer 
of cattle that he would pay therefor on their arrival, 
though made \Yithout intention to pay, was not a 
fraudulent representation or false pretense in the 
legal acceptance of the terms. 
''Elements of Offense Charged. Since the 
accused can be legally convicted only of 
the offenge eharged in the indictment or 
information, it is apparent that the evi-
dence adduced must be in conformity with 
and be sufficient to sustain the material 
elements of the crime alleged. Proof of a 
different offense than that laid in ~he plead--
ing would be fatal to the prosecution and 
must necessarily result in an acquittal.'' 
25 Cyc. of Proeedure 552, and cases there 
cited. 
ThiR principle is so \vell established in the law that 
further citations are unnecessary. 
The court \\Tas in error in holding that some crime 
had been comntitted. An examination of the evi-
dence- shows that the defendant was guilty of no 
erime whatsoever. If we assume that the defendant 
misrepresented the financial condition of Hill Bros. 
Alfalfa Milling Company, of 'vhich he "\vas manager, 
nnd had obtained the hay in question upon that mis-
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representation, still he did not commit any offense. 
The representation made by the defendant was 
that the company had sufficient outstanding 
accounts "\vhich ~ould be collected and the hay paid 
for "Within thirty days. In other words, the de-
fendant purchased the hay 'vith the understanding 
and agreement that it would be p~aid for within 
thirty days. The agreement was oral. No written 
representation as to the financial condition of the 
company was made. 
Sec. 103-18-9, R. S. lJ tah 1933, 
provides in effect that where one obtains credit by 
a false representation in "rriting resp·ecting the 
financial condition or ability of himself or those 
for whom he is a.cting, to pay, he is guilty of a mis-
demeanor. It necessarily follows that unless the 
false rep,resentation is written, no offense is com-
mitted. 
II. 
ASSIGNMENT 0~-, ERROR NO. 19 
This assignment relates to the error of the court 
in directing the State to file a suppJemental bill of 
particulars after the case had been tried and sub-
mitted. 
We will briefly summarize the record under this 
assignment. The complaint before the justice of 
the peace ·'charged the deifenda,nt 'vit.li obtabiing 
by false pretenses hay belonging to Dudley and 
Reed Crafts, the false pretense being that the de-
fendant had represented that he was solvent, when 
in fact he was insolvent. The information was 
identical with the complaint. The bill of partic-
ulars and the supplemental bill of particulars, both 
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filed February 23, 1940, detailed the false rep,re-
sentntions alleged to have been made. Instead of 
proving the case as alleged, the State proved that 
the hay belonged to Reed Crafts and I. R. P'arker, 
and that it 'ya.s purchased by defendant for Hill 
Bros. Alfalfa ~filling Company upon 30-days' 
credit. 
At the conclusion of the evidence and after both 
the State and defendant had rested, the defendant 
requested the court to dismiss the case and find 
the defendant not guilty because there was no evi-
dence which tended to show that the defendant was 
guilty of any crime whatsoever. Instead of de· 
ciding the case as tried and either finding the de .. 
fpndant guilty or not guilty of the crime attempted 
to be charged in the information, the court directed 
the district attorney to file within ten days. a sup--
plemental bill of particulars alle~ng· that. the de-
fendant had obtained hay by false p~retenses from 
I. R. Parker and Reed Crafts, the false pretens,es 
being that the defendant had misrepresented the 
financial condition of Hill Bros. Alfalfa MilHng 
Company. 
At the threshold of the inquiry we are met with 
three questions : Is a bill of particulars in a crim-
inal case superior and paramount to the informa-
tion~ Can a bill o{ ptarticulars give a court juris-
diction to determine the guilt or innocence of a. de-
fendant of a crime upon which no pTeliminary ex-
an1ination has ever been waived or had and upon 
which no information has ever heen filed~ When 
the evidence discloses that the offense for which 
the defendant has been hound over to the District 
Court and upon \Vhich an information has bePn 
filed, has not been committed, does the court4 be-
cause he erroneously supposes that so1ne other 
offense has been comn1i tted, have jurisdiction to 
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order the filing of a bill of p~articulars to cover the 
supposed. offense, and then declare the defendant 
guilty of the supposed offense and sentence him 
not to a supposed, but to a real p·enitentiary~ 
\Vhat need is there of a complaint before the justice 
of the peace, a p,reliminary examination on tliat 
complaint, the filing of an information and a trial 
upon that information, if they are to be superseded 
by a bill of particulars charging an entirely new and 
distinct offense~ Asking' the question, answers it. 
The trial court was not clear as to the correctness 
of the proceeding which he adopted. He allowed 
the State ten days in \vhich to file the sup·plemental 
bill of particulars ; he thereafter ordered the de-
fendant brought before him to p~lead to that sup-
plemental hill of particulars. Pause for one mo-
ment. The information and two bills of particulars 
had been filed7 the defendant had been tried and 
had moved for a dismissal of the case, moved to 
have the case determined upon the issues upon 
which it had been tried; instead. of decidin~ thP 
case, the court ordered a supplemental bill of par-
. ticulars filed and gave. the Sta.te ten days in which 
to file it. 
This supplemental bill of particulars was filed on 
March 4, 1940, and afterwards and in tl?-e month of 
April the defendant was directed to appear heforP. 
the court for further p~roceedings 1tnder that sup-
plem.ent.rrl bill o.f particu.l ars. He d1d appear on 
April 9, 1940, and was requested by the court to 
plead to that s11pplemental bill of particulars. Not-
'vithstanding that th~ defendant had entered a plea 
;of not gu'ilty to the offense alleged in the inforlna-
tion, and notwithstanding he had been tried urider 
that information, and not"rithstanding that both 
parties had r~sted, the court desired the defend-
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ant to plead a.ne'v to the supplemental bill of 'P'ar-
·ieulars \Yhieh he, the court, had ordered filed. 
'Yhen the de~endant refused to ple-ad, the court an-
nounced that h~ 'Yould entertain an application on 
the part of the defendant to reopen the case and 
present further eYidence if the defendant desirea. 
What eould it avail the defendant to offer evi-
dence in vie"'" of the fact that the court had already 
pronounced him guilty of the offense~ Was the 
defendant expected to p·rove his innocence~ Did 
the court desire the defendant to introduce evi-
dence to change the eourt 's opinion~ In view of the 
rulings of the court and the decision that he had 
already made, it would have been a Herculean task 
to change the mind of the court. The labor of 
Sisyphus \vas easy compared to what the court, was 
asking. 
The holding by the trial court that a bill of partic-
ulars is sup·erior to and supplants the information 
\vas clearly error. This Court held in 
State v. Solomon, 93 Utah 70; 71 Pac. (2d) 
104, 
that the bill of partieulars was no 'part of the in-
formation. In 
State v. Jessop, 100 Pac. (2d) 969, 
this Court held that in a criminal prosecution the 
function of a bill of particulars is not that of com-
pelling the defendants to aid the prosecution in 
stating a cause of action. The authorities are uni-
form that the office of a bill of particulars is to in-
form the defendant what the State expects to 
prove, and is no part of t.he information. 
Schaumloeffel v. State, 62 Atl. 803, 804; 
102 Md. 470. 
Clary v. Commonwealth, 173 S. W. 171, 173; 
163 Ky. 48. 
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In United States v. Gouled, 253 Fed. 239, 
it is held that the office of a hill of particulars is 
to advise the court, and more particularly the de-
fendant, of "\Vhat facts he will he required to meet, 
and when a hill of particulars is made and served, 
it concludes the rights of all parties and the p·ros-
ecution must be confined to the p'articulars spec1 .. 
fied. See also 
State v. Harness, 238 N. W. 430. 
Instead of applying the principles of law as laid 
down in the above cases, the court apparently took 
the view that a hill of particulars supersedes and 
supplants the information, and gives the court 
jurisdiction of the person and offense described in 
that bill of particulars, ·even though no prelim-
inary hearing had been held on the offense de-
scribed therein and no inforn1ation filed thereon. 
The supp,lemental bill of particulars 'vhich the court 
ordered filed as of 1\{arch 4, 1940, "\Vas a nullity. 
The court had no authority to order it filed, and the 
filing of it did not vest the court V\rith any po\ver 
or authority to take any action under it. The sup-
plemental bill of particulars describes an entirely 
different offense from that "\vhich is . pretended to 
be set forth in the original com~pla.int and informa-
tion. It attemp~ts to describe one offense, the in-
formation another. Assume that. the defendant 
should again he charged with the offense set forth 
in his original complaint and the in-formation filed 
thereon; as a defense to that action, could he plead 
that he had been once in je~p~ardy and hed been found 
guilty, and as evidence of former jeopardy set up 
the conviction under that supplemental bill of par-
ticulars~ If the State should desire to retry the 
rlefendant on the charge that he had obtained hay 
from Dudley and Reed Crafts hy falsely rep~re-
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senting his financial condition, vvould a plea of once 
111 jeopardy lie, and would that plea he sustained 
by the defendant's sho"\Ying that he had been con-
Yicted of obtaining hay fron1 Reed Crafts and I. R. 
Parker by falsely representing the condition of Hill 
Bros. Alfalfa 1\!illing Company~ The question 
illustrates very clearly the error of the court in 
directing the supp~lemental hill of particulars to be 
filed. The court seemed to have one thing in mind 
only, and that \vas hy what method could he find 
the defendant guilty of some offense. Although 
the court 'vas perfectly satisfied that the offense 
alleged in the information had not been proven, he 
,,~as determined that the defendant should be found 
guilty of something:, even though that something 
was entirely distinct and apart from the offense for 
'\vhic~ the defendant had been charged and for 
which he had been tried. The court justified his 
::.ction under the reformed p.rocedure. How this 
Court can sustain the lower eourt under the re-
formed plrocedure or any other p·rocedure we are 
at a loss to understand. The action of the trial 
court can only be sustained by dis,regarding funda-
mental p.rinciples of law and wiping out sacred 
safeguards which have come down through the ages 
for the protection of individual rights. 
The reasoning of the court in directin~ a supple-
mental bill of p~articulars to hP filed is. most unique. 
The court, after finding that there was no evidence 
as to the solvency or insolvency of the defendant 
individually, said: 
"It therefore appears that if the informa-
tion in this case referred to a rep·resen-
ta.tion as to the fin an rial condition of the 
corporation and that the hay was sold to 
the corporation in reliance upon the cor-
poration being in good financial condi-
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ing accounts, that the information is sus-
tained by the proofs offered. But if the 
information refers to a representation as 
to the ability of the defendant individually 
to pay for it, then there is no proof." (Tr. 
48). 
The court then s.aid it would he proper under the 
provisions of 
·Sec. 105-21-43 and 105-21-44 
to direct that the bill of particulars be amended, or 
tha.t a new bill of partie.ulars be furnished which 
sets out the matters that the court had referred to 
as being proved so that there would be no question 
as to the charge that is made against the defend- . 
ant; that proof had been of~ered showing obtaining 
property under false pretenses, 
''but that the bill of particulars (under 
which the case was tried) is not definite 
enough and does not prop·erly cover the 
false p.retenses \Vhich it appears have been 
proved .... the info·rmation is silent as 
to the particulars of the offense, so that 
it c:ould refer to a statement made as to 
· the financial condition of the eompany or 
the defendant individually." (Tr. 49). 
'rhe court thus disregarded both bills of partic-
ulars '\Vhich had theretofore been filed and both 
of which set forth the. false representations as be~ 
ing that of the ability of the individual to pay. 
They were of no more consequence to the court. 
If the information was as dup,liciJous as the court 
indicated it was, and that under it proof could be 
made as fo the financial ability of the defendant to 
pay or the financial ability of the corporation to 
pay, just as the State sa-\v fit, then he should have 
sustained the motion to quash. 
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m. 
ASSIGNniENTS 1 TO o 
Assignn1ents of error 1 to 6, each inclusive, relate 
to the rulings of the trial court in overruling the 
motion to quash the information and in refusing to 
quash the bills of particulars filed ],ebrua.ry 23, 
1940, and in overruling the defendant's objection 
to the introduction of evidf~nce because the court 
did not have jurisdiction of the offenBe pretended 
to be charged, and in permitting the State to amend 
the first bill of particulars after the trial had bP-
gun (Tr. 2 to 9; J. R. 20). 
The defendant insisted before the trial court that 
the complaint before the justice of the p~eace did 
not state a public offense, also that the informa-
tion did not state a p~ublic offense. The defendant 
still insists that no offense is sta~d either in the 
comp~laint before the justice of the peace nor in the 
information filed in the District Court. The m-
formation is under the so-called ''Reformed Pro-
cedure,'' but the reformed procedure cannot change 
the fundamental law. Any statute changing the 
fundamental law is clearly unconstitutional. 
A bill of particulars cannot be used to aid the in-
·fonnation in stating a public offense~ 
~rticle I, Section XIII of the Constitution 
of Utah, 
provides that offenses which had theretofore been 
prosecuted by indictment shall be prosecuted by 
information after examination and com1nitment by 
a magistrate. Information, as used in the Consti-
tution at the time it 'vas ado·pted, means an accusa-
tion in writing in form and substance like an in-
dictment for the same offense, charging a person 
with a public offense. Sep 
Sec. 4606, R·. S. Utah 1898. 
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Under Article I, Section XII of the Consti-
tution of Utah, ·-
an accused is guaranteed the right to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him and 
to have a copy thereof. The information must be 
in such detail as will furnish the accused with a. 
description of the charge :against him sufficient to 
enable him to make a defense. it must be suffi-
' . 
ciently specific to avail him of the right upon con-
viction or acquittal to p-rotect him against a fur .. 
ther prosecution for the same offense. 
As heretofore referred to, the 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section XII, 
provides that the accused shall have the right to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him and to have a copy thereof. 
The Con8titution of the United States, 
Amendment VI, 
·provides. that the accus,ed has the right "to he in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation'' 
ag1ainst him. 
It is seen that the two Co~titutional provisions are 
almost identical. This language has been frequent-
ly construed by the Supreme Court and Federal 
CourtS' of the United States to mean that the in-
dictment, here the information, must set forth the 
offense With clearness and all necessary certainty 
to apprise the accus.ed of the crfme 'vith which hP-
stands charged, and that every ingredient of which 
the offense is composed must he accurately and 
clearly alleged. The cases so holding have been 
heretofore cited .. 
It is very clear that a bill of particulars is no part 
of· an indictment or information. 
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State v. Solomon, 93 Utah 70; 71 Pac. 
{2d) 104 
State v. Jessop, (Utah). 100 Pac. (2d) 969. 
Wright y. People, (Colo.), 91 Pac. ( 2d) 499. 
People Y. ''restrup,, (Ill.), 25 N. E. (2d) 16. 
United ·states v. Lynch, 11 Fed. (2d) 298. 
Jarl v. U. S., 19 Fed. (2d) 891. 
State v. Gilbert, (N. H.), 194 Atl. 728. 
United States v. Tubbs. 94 Fed. 356. 
This naturally follows from the well known maxim 
that what is required to appear of record must be 
shown by the record a.nd by the right record. Hence, 
when the Constitution provides, as heretofore re-
ferred to, that the accused has the right to demand 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, 
'vhich, under similar prrovisions of the Cons,titution 
of the United States has so frequently heen con-
strued to mean, that the indictment or information 
itself must contain with clearness and certainty 
every ingredient of \vhich the offense is composed. 
it needs no argument to show that the legislature 
may not p,rovide that such ingredients may be 
stated or furnished by a bill of particulars, or by 
some other document, or by some other method 
other than or different from a cornp1iance with fhe 
Constitutional provision. It is no doubt contended 
by the State that in view of 
Chap. 21, Sec. 105-21-9, Laws 1935, 
that whatever defect there may be in an information 
or indictment in not sufficiently stating the offense 
therein, may be cured or avoided by a bill of par-
ticulars, which section p,rovides that \vhen an in-
formation or indictment charges an offense· in 
accordanr~ ·w·ith the provisions of 
Sec. 105-21-8, 
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but fails to inform the defendant of the particulars 
of the offense sufficiently to enable him to prepare 
his defense or give- him such inform-ation as he is 
entitled to under the Constitution of this /]tate. the 
court may require or direct the prosecuting attor-
ney to furnish the defendant a bill of particulars. 
The cases heretofore cited and referred to, and es-
pecially the case of 
Goldberg v. United States, 277 Fed. 211. 
that the facts must be set forth in the--indictment 
or information which the pleader claims constitute 
the alleged transgressions so distinctly as to ad-
vise the a.ccus.ed of the charge which he has. to meet 
and to give him a fair opportunity to prepare his 
defense, and to enable the court to determine 
u;hether the facts as there sta.ted are suffic-ient ta 
supp-ort ,a conviction, and that the facts as 80 stated 
may enable the accused to avail himself of a con-
:viction or acquittal in defense of another prosecu-
tion for the same offense. 
State v. McKenna, 24 Utah 317; 67 Pac. 815. 
State v. Topham, 41 Utah 39; 123 Pa.c. 888. 
Statf.' v. Gesas., 49 Utah 181; 162 Pac. 366. 
_State- v. Steele, 67 Utah 1; 245 Pac. 332. 
State v. Hale, (Utah), 263 Pac. 86 
State v. IJund, 75 Utah 559; 286 Pac. 960. 
Lynch v. United States, 10 Fed. (2d) 947. 
Goldberg v. United States, 277 Fed. 211. 
United States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483; 8 S. 
Ct. 571; 31 L. Ed. 516 
.Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 153 
Fed. 1; 82 C. c.· A. 135; 14 L. R. A .. 
(N. S.) 400. 
Floren v. United States, 186 Fed. 961; 108 
C. C. A. 577. 
Miller v. United States, 133 Fed. 337, 341 ~ 
66 C. C. A. 399, 403. 
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Naftzger v. United States, 200 Fed. 494. 
50:2; 118 C. C. A. 598~ 604. 
United States v. Britton, 107 U. S. 665: 
2 Sup. Ct. 512; 27 L. Ed. 520~ 
Etheredg'e v. United States, 186 :B,ed. 434; 
108 c. c. A. 356. 
Winters v. United States, 201 Fed. 845, 848; 
1:20 C. C . . l\ .. 175, 189. 
Horn v. United States, 182 Fed. 721; 105 
C. C. A. 163, 167. 
Fontana v. United States, 262 :B..,ed. 283. 
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; 
23 L. Ed. 588. 
Where the statute itself directly and sufficiently 
prescribes the ingredients of the offense, an in-
formation or an indictment in the language of tha 
statute ordinarily is a sufficient compliance with 
the Constitutional provision. But where the stat-
ute defines the offense only in generic terms, then 
to satisfy the Constitutional p·rovision, the infor-
mation or indictment must go further in stating thP· 
offense than by merely using the language of 'the 
statute, and in which case, the information or in-
dictment muRt descend to the particulars and to a 
statement of all of the elements and ingredients of 
the offense. 
State v. Jessop,; supra, and other cases 
heretofore cited. 
By the provision of the code of criminal procedure 
as provided by Session La,vs, 1935, and by 
Sec. 105-21-4 7, 
short forms of informations and indictments e:tre 
specified. Among other things, it is there p1rovided 
that an information charging murder is sufticient 
merely to state that '' AB murdered CD,'' without 
stating anything else as to time, place or means of 
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the commission of the offense, or any of the in-
gredients of murder. So, too, charging that '' AB 
embezzled $50.00 of CD'' was a sufficient charge 
of embezzlement. That a charge, that "AB ob-
tained an automobile from CD by means of false 
pretenses,'' was a sufficient charge to constitute 
the offense of falsp pretenses. 
It is app·arent that such informations or indict-
ments in no sense are a compliance V\rith the con-
stitutional provision, that by the indictment or in-
formation itself, the accused is entitled to demand 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him 
\vhich, as heretofore shoV\rn and as a similar pro-
vision construed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, means that the information or indictment 
itself must se~ forth the offense with clearness. \vith 
nll necessary certainty as to every ingredient 
constituting the offense. It is very clear that ~uch 
an information or indictment as referred to in 
Sec. 105-21-47, Laws of 1935, 
does not give the accused such information as he is 
entitled to under. the Constitution. 
The question then is: l\Iay such information when 
given by a bill of particulars constitute a compli-
ance with the Constitutional provision~ If it be 
considered and as detern1ined by the Supre1ne Cour1 
of this State and in the cases heretofore cited, that 
the bill of p·articulars is no part of the indictment 
or information and can in no sense aid an informa-
tion or indictment itself defective in not sufficient-
ly stating• the ess~ntial elements and ingredients 
of the offense, then it is. very clear that the infor-
mation here, stated in mere generic terms and 
charging merely as indicated by the short forn1 of 
information as provided hy SeRsion Laws of 19~5, 
is wholly insufficient and not in comp~liance ,with 
the Constitutional provision. 
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We recognize that in some jurisdictions it has been 
held that a bill of particulars may aid an informa-
tion or indictment, though defective in substance 
as 'vell as in fonn. But under jurisdictions having 
Constitutional provisions as in our Con8titution, as 
to the requirements of an information or an in-
dictment, the g-reat weight of authority is that an 
information or indictment defective in substance 
cannot be aided by a bill of particulars.. But what-
ever conflict there may be upon that question, we 
think it :set at rest by the decisions of the Sup1reme 
Court of this State, that a bill of particulars is no 
part of an information or indictn1ent and tlence, 
cannot aid an information or indictment which does 
not comply with the requirements. of the Con-
stitution. 
However, in addition to all this and as heretofore 
argued, the bill of particulars authorized and 
directed by the court to be filed by the p~rosecuting 
attorney after the case was tried and submitted for 
decision, shows a statement of an offense wholly 
separate and distinct from that charged in the in-
fornlation. Let it be noticed that the court here did 
not grant leave nor direct the prosecuting attorney 
to file sn amended information in accordance with 
the bill of particulars ordered and directed. And 
had the court done so, it is very clear that the in-
formation could not be amended in such particular, 
for to do so, would permit the information to be 
amended as to a separate, independent and dis-
tinct offense, and it is clear that ,vhat is eharged in 
the 'information and what is p·resented by the bill 
of p,articulars in question, constitute two sep,arate 
and distinct offenses. 
In the next place, the accused is required to ·p,Iead 
to an information or an indictment. He is. not re-
quired to plead to a bill of p·articulars. The court 
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has no authority to require a plea of the accused 
otherwise than to an indictment or information, 
and when the court thus required the accused to 
plead to the bill of particulars, the court clearly 
transcended its authority. That is the effect of the 
:holllin;..;· of this Court in the case of 
State v. Solomon, sup~ra. 
Lastly, by Laws of 1935 relating to the code of 
criminal procedure and by 
Sec. 105-23-3, 
it is provided that a motion to quash is available, 
among other things, and as stated in subdivision 
(e) thereof, 
''that it appears from a bill of particulars 
fu~nished under the provisions of Sec. 
105-21-9 that the ·particulars stated do not 
constitute the offense charged in the in-
formation or indictment,'' 
etc., and as heretofore urged, the bill of particulars 
ordered and directed by the court, after trial on the 
information and a submission of the case, stated 
particulars constituting an offense other than or 
different from that charged in the information1 and 
no leave asked and none ~ranted~ to permit an 
amended informatio:n, and as. heretofore urg~ed, an 
amended information could not even be granted sub-
stituting one offense for another. 
IV. 
ASSIGNMENTS 12 AND 13 
The court erred in admitting p!laintiff's Exhibit A. 
and in p·ermitting the witness Pearson to tes.tify 
as to the financial condition of the corporation. 
We will group together Assignments Nos. 12 and 
13, covering the above errors. Exhibit A purports 
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to be a report of the financial condition of Hill 
Bros. Alfalfa Milling Comp~any as, of June 30, 1939. 
It was compiled by Mr. Pearson, \vho at the time 
of trial, ,, ... as a bank teller at Nephi. From July, 
1~138, until the tir:St of June, 193.9, when Hill Bros 
Alfalfa Milling Con1pany was organized, Pearson 
\vas in the employ of Hill Brothers as bookkeeper 
(Tr. :.28). From June 1, 1939, until about the 20th 
of August, 1939, he continued as bookkeeper for 
the corporation and "\vas also secretary-treasurer of 
the corporation ( Tr. 28-29). ·V\7ho Hill Brothers 
were is not shown. The only reference \Ve have to 
any such parties is the statement of the 'vitness 
Pearson that he \Vas bookkeeper for them. No 
presumption can be indulged in that the defendant 
was one of them. As secretarv-treasurer of the 
. u 
corporation, Pearson was supposed to keep the 
books and get out financial statements. The first 
sheet in the report is the balance sheet, the next is 
the profit and loss statement, and the last shows 
.how the money was spent. The report was made 
some time in July and was intended to show some-
thing of the affairs of the comp·any as of June 30, 
1939, as will be shown by the sheet bearing the sig-
nature of Pearson (Tr. 30). 
Certain items, towit, machinery and equipment, 
buildings and land, are shown under fixed asset~ 
on the first sheet of the report. Just how the valu-
ation of those items was arrived at was not de-
termined (Tr. 32). 
This report, over objection of the defendant .. was 
received in evidence; the witness was then asked, 
"Now, what was the financial condition of the com-
pany on July the 31st, 1939, in comp~arison to this 
date of June 30, 1939, when this statement wa.s got-
t~n out?" to which the witness replied that it was 
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better July 31st than it "\vas June 30th by between 
six and ei.ght hundred dollars. 
The books of the corporation were not produced, 
although they were in the possession of the sheriff 
of Millard County. 
Exhibit A was erroneously admitte_d for several 
reasons. In the first p~laceJ the financial condition 
of Hill Bros .. Alfalfa !1illing Company was not an 
issue. There had been no claim at that time that 
there ha.d been any representation as to the finan-
cial standing of the corporation. The only issue 
was as to the rep·resentations made and financial 
condition of the defendant personally. 
Next, the prop~er foundation was not laid for the 
admission of Exhibit A. ·we believe it is elemen-
tary that before books. of account can be admitted 
that it must be shown tha.t they vlere correctly kept 
and that the items in there are true, and that they 
are relevant to the issue. 
An account book of original entries, fair on its. face 
and shown to have been kept in the usual coursA 
of business, is admissible in evidence in favor of the 
party by whom it is kep·t. Ordinarily a person's 
books of account cannot be used as evidence up1on 
issues betw-een thitfd persons. The entries in such 
books as to third pers·ons are res inter alios .acta 
and may not be introduced unless a foundation is 
laid for their admission on special grounds. 
10 R. C. L. 1176. 
In Notes 53 L. R. A. 513, 
the annotator says that the general rule is that a 
person's books of account cannot be l!Sed as evi-
dence upon issues between third persons ; that en-
tries in such books as to such third p~ersons are res 
inter alios acta and cannot he used a.gains~t per-
sons not parties to them. Citing cases. 
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The corporation, Hill Bros . ..:-\.lfalfa 1\Iilling Com-
pany, is not a party to this action. The books and 
records of the corporation themselves could not be 
put in eYidence against the defendant Hill. Nor is 
it sho,,-n that he '"as a party to or connected with 
the transactions concerning the entries of the books 
of the corporation. If the books of the corporation 
"Tere not then1selves admissible in evidence, then it 
is clear that no copy or statement of the books would 
be admissible. Thoug-h the defendant Hill had been 
a party to or connected -v.Tith the transactions con-
cerning the entries of the books and the statement 
made from the books and p·ut in evidence, still the 
hooks or the statement "rould be inadmissible, for· 
that to be- admissible in any case and as.. stated in 
a leading case. 
Radtke v. Taylor, 105 Ore. 559; 210 P·ac 
863. 
and particularly, 
27 A. L. R. 1423, 
the books must appear to have been honestly kept, . 
that they must be books of original entry, that thP 
entries must have been made in the regular cours.e 
of the entrant's business or employment, that the 
entries must have been fairly contemporaneous 
with the transactions entered, that the entrant must 
verify the correctness of the books, or his absence he 
account0d for and that the- entrant must know of 
his O"\\TJl knowledge the truth of the transaction which 
he enters or his testimony he sup·p·lemented hy one 
having knowledge. None of these requirements 
·were shown, nor indeed "\vas there any foundation 
laid for the admissibility of the books jn evidence, 
or with respect to a statement made from the books, 
or what books or the nature or character thereof 
that were examined by the author making the 
statement, or as to 'vha.t knowledge he had of or 
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concerning the nature or character of the hooks ex-
amined by him. 
It \Va~ from this report, Exhibit A, that the court 
concluded that the defendant had made fals,e state-
ments concerning the financial condition of the cor-
poration at the time the hay in question \Vas pur-
chased. Without this ·report, there was no evidence 
of any kind whatever as to the financial condition 
of the corporation. Manif~stly, the ad1nission of 
<this evidence vvas prejudicial to the defendant. 
What has been said of Exhibit A applies also to 
the question asked \yi tness Pearson as to the finan-
cial condition of the .company as of July 31, 1939. 
There are other errors assigned relating to the ad-
mission of evidence, especially in admitting the 
testimony of Mr .. Crafts, Assignment of Error 16, 
and Rulon Hinckley, Frank Roberts and Peter Gron-
ning, Assignment o£ Error 17. These witnesses 
testified to what the defendant s.aid to them in 
October, 1939, concerning the financial condition of 
the company on July 31i 1939, '"·hen the hay was 
purchased. This evidence waR offered on the theory 
tha.t it was an admission by the defendant. As \Ve 
have heretofore said~ the financial condition of the 
corporation was not in issue and .anything· said con-
~erning the financial condition of the corporation 
wa.s irrelevant and immaterial. Further, the corpu~ 
delecti had not been proven and never was proven : 
hence, the admission of thi~ testimony was plainly 
error. 
For the manifest reasons stated in this brief, the 
case should be reversed with directions that the 
:samP should be dismissed and thP- defendant 
released. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLARD HANSON, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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